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Brentano and Mauthner on grammatical illusions 





This paper aims to suggest that Brentano’s theory of intentionality, at least in its later 
formulation, is not only about mind and also belongs to a tradition of deconstructing language 
that includes prominent figures of Austrian and German philosophy such as Mach, Vaihinger, 
and Wittgenstein. In order to establish this, the author explores some differences and 
similarities between this theory and Fritz Mauthner’s critique of language. He argues that the 







In the current literature Brentano’s name is usually associated with British empiricism, the 
Aristotelian tradition, and the so-called “Austrian semantic turn”. This paper seeks to suggest 
a convergence with another tradition within Austrian philosophy — namely the critique of 
language developed, among others, by Mach, Mauthner, Karl Kraus, the German Vaihinger, 
and Wittgenstein. My starting hypothesis is that, despite significant differences, the late 
Brentano’s approach to grammatical illusions has a great deal in common with Fritz 
Mauthner’s critique of language. 
One of the first authors who noticed the similarities between the two philosophers was Oskar 
Kraus. In his Self-Presentation from 1929, Kraus says that the late Brentano’s search for a 
criterion for autosemantic expressions clearly belongs to the same movement as the critique of 
language of Vaihinger and Mauthner (Kraus 1929: 16, cited in Weiler 1970: 297). The 
connections between Brentano and Mauthner have been investigated at length later, above all 
by Liliana Albertazzi (1986, 1989, 1990) and, to a lesser extent, by Gershon Weiler (1970). 
Some other commentators have drawn attention to them without further discussion. For 
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example, Cesalli and Mulligan rightly claim that Brentano’s critique of language was an 
“opening shot of the Austrian critique of language to which Marty, Mauthner, Oskar and Karl 
Kraus and Wittgenstein will all contribute” (Cesalli & Mulligan 2017: 257). This paper is an 
attempt to bring forward some new or newly formulated ideas on the relation between 
Brentano and Mauthner. 
1. Critique of language 
Fritz Mauthner terms his philosophical project as a whole “critique of language” 
(Sprachkritik). In his view, the philosopher’s sole task is to liberate us from the illusions of 
language. The basic idea is twofold. First, language necessarily generates grammatical 
illusions that are pervasive and play a central role in science, philosophy, religion, politics, 
and everyday life. Secondly, Mauthner defends the extreme skeptical view to the effect that 
these illusions make language in general “inadequate for knowing the world and hence for 
communicating knowledge” (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 1: 122). We cannot enrich our 
knowledge of the world through language; all language consists of only tautologies (Mauthner 
1901-2, Vol. 1: 93; Weiler 1958: 82; Weiler 1970: 236 ff.). 
Brentano, too, holds that grammar spontaneously generates illusions, and that an essential part 
of the philosopher’s task is to dissolve these illusions through philosophical clarification. In 
his late correspondence with Marty, he calls these grammatical illusions “entia rationis” or 
“fictions”, as opposed to entia realia or things (Brentano 1977: 324). Grammar leads us to 
introduce illegitimate entities — fictions — which as such are no more than entia linguae, or 
entia elocutionis in Marty’s terminology (Brentano 1977: 191). It is unclear whether Brentano 
defended this view only in his reist period or also in earlier writings. Some commentators, for 
example Massimo Libardi  (1996: 68), claim that the struggle against entia rationis thus 
conceived is basic not only to Brentano’s late reism, but to his work as a whole. 
Brentano’s line of reasoning can be summed up as follows: First, the theory of intentionality 
teaches us that not all phenomena really exist. Some thought objects are real things and some 
are fictions, that is, possible correlates of synsemantic expressions. Second, grammar is 
deceiving because synsemantic expressions are grammatically indistinguishable from 
autosemantic expressions. A fictitious name can have the same grammatical function within a 
sentence as the name of a real thing. For example you can say “A round square is impossible” 
or “Freedom is better than slavery”. This may lure you into the illusion that round squares and 
freedom are real things. Since the term “round square” is the grammatical subject of the 
sentence “a round square is impossible”, it looks as if the round square were a thing that has 
the property of being impossible. However, a round square is not a real thing, but a fiction. 
We mistake it for a real thing because the grammatical function of the term “round square” in 
the sentence prompts us to do so. Actually, Brentano argues, there is “no more than a specific 
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linguistic phrasing that leads one to the fiction of a new being” (Brentano 1977: 172). Thirdly 
and finally, we need a criterion for distinguishing entia rationis from entia realia. Since 
synsemantic expressions are grammatically indistinguishable from autosemantic expressions, 
this criterion must come from elsewhere than from grammar itself. In Brentano’s view, it is 
psychological analysis that enables us to sort out synsemantic from autosemantic expressions 
and thus to discriminate fictions from real things (Brentano 1977: 173). 
The non-grammatical criterion the late Brentano proposes for distinguishing entia rationis 
from entia realia is, at least in part, psychological. It is stated as follows: “Every object of a 
presentation, if it exists, is real” (Brentano 1977: 380). This criterion sets two conditions for 
something being an ens reale. First, there must be a presentation (or intuition, as Brentano 
also says): “It is impossible, claims Brentano, to have a presentation without having a 
presentation of something. And this ‘something’ means something real” (Brentano 1977: 173). 
Being real is a necessary condition for being presented. In other words: If an intentional 
object is presented, then it must be real; if it is an ens rationis or fiction, then it cannot be 
presented and one or more acts of the two other classes can be identified through 
psychological analysis. Thus, wherever psychological analysis uncovers a genuine 
presentation, that is, an act that is not reducible to a judgment or feeling, the object presented 
must be real. This first requirement leads us to deny that abstract terms like “color” and 
“space” as well as dispositional, negative, and most mathematical expressions denote entia 
realia.1 
The second condition is that the ens reale must actually exist. It is not easy to work out 
exactly what this further requirement adds to the first one. On my interpretation, Brentano’s 
aim might be to confine entia realia to just the things given in present inner perception. It is 
well known that the late Brentano defended a form of presentism according to which, as he 
declares in his posthumous Versuch über die Erkenntnis, “‘being’ means ‘present’” (‘Seiend’ 
heisst soviel als ‘gegenwärtig’) (Brentano 1970: 27). Since only what is perceived, that is, 
innerly perceived, is present, it follows from this that only mental phenomena can be present 
and hence real, while other phenomena must be fictions. 
                                                 
1 Albertazzi (2006: 177-178) provides the following list of entia rationis: “1. All abstract nouns like ‘extension’, 
‘colour’, ‘thought’, ‘space’, ‘time’, given that in reality there exists only the extended, the coloured, the thinking, 
something spatial, temporal. 2. Nouns expressing possibility like ‘capacity for thought’, ‘capacity for 
movement’. 3. The contents of presentations like ‘the non-being of the centaur is’, ‘a non-existent centaur is’. 4. 
Whatever belongs to the Aristotelian category of ens per accidens. For example, in ‘this man is armed’ the 
predicate has solely the meaning of an extrinsic determinatio, given that there is no real identity between subject 
and predicate. 5. Whatever belongs to the Aristotelian category of ens tamquam verum. For example, one can 
only say that ‘an oak is’ if one recognizes an oak; or ‘the non-being of the centaur’ only means that one denies a 
centaur. 6. All scientific fictions, like unreal numbers, fractions, infinity and infinitesimals in mathematics.” 
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In any case, there are obvious similarities between these views and Mauthner’s critique of 
language. Both Brentano and Mauthner hold that we all cling to fictions as if they were real 
objects, that the reason for this is grammatical, and that part or whole of the philosopher’s job 
is to denounce such grammatical illusions. This corresponds to what Mauthner calls “word 
fetishism”. Some expressions are misleadingly used in such a way that their surface grammar 
function or category induces us to take them as denoting real things, while they actually don’t: 
“Most people have the weakness to believe that, since a word is present, it must be a word for 
something, and that, since a word is present, something real must correspond to it” (Mauthner 
1901-2, Vol. 1: 159). This means, in Brentano’s terms, that some expressions are used as if 
they corresponded to presentations and thus to real things, while they actually don’t. 
 
2. Language doesn’t refer to the outside world 
I come now to Mauthner’s skepticism. His most central view about language is that language 
does not refer to the world. Mauthner denies that language in general has a referential 
function at all. In his view, language has instead mainly two functions, a practical and an 
expressive one. First, words serve to register memories within a linguistic community. The 
memories of a people are stored in its language just as the memories of an individual are 
stored in her brain (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 1: 179, 184-185; Mauthner 1906: 26-27). 
Secondly, words have a poetical or expressive function which is carried out by a small 
number of original thinkers. Such-and-such an experience A puts the original thinker in a 
specific mood (Stimmung), that is, brain state. The original thinker then associates this brain 
state with such-and-such a word or combination of words which is commonly associated with 
another experience B, so that the linguistic community can then use this new association in 
order to register experiences: the word used by the poet can now be used to register both 
experiences A and B, and then the experience A only. In Mauthner’s view, the expressive 
function is prior to the mnemonic function. The vocabulary of a language is constituted by 
poetical expressions that have lost their expressive value. 
To sum up: We associate a given word with some specific memories because our linguistic 
community prescribes to do so, and our linguistic community prescribes to do so because in 
the past a poet associated this word with a specific mood or brain state which had until then 
been associated with other words and memories. Words are primarily signs for moods, and it 
is only secondarily that they are taken to denote objects, namely those objects which cause the 
corresponding mood in the poet’s mind. For this reason, Mauthner claims, “words never 
produce knowledge, they are just tools for poetry” (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 1: 151). 
The key point here is that language, for Mauthner, neither refers nor enables us to know 
reality. The ultimate function of language is solely expressive or aesthetic: language expresses 
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moods or brain states that are associated with our presentations of the real world — and this 
association should not be conceived of as a relation of reference. There exist no expressions 
that denote real objects. Hence, language and knowledge are mutually incompatible and 
knowledge is impossible. 
In Mauthner’s view, words and concepts have no direct connection with presentations; they 
just express aesthetic moods that are incidentally associated with presentations. Of course, 
Brentano was not a skeptic. Unlike Mauthner, he did believe that some linguistic expressions 
really denoted entia realia, namely present mental phenomena. While Brentano claims that 
“all our concepts derive from intuitions” (Brentano 1977: 329), Mauthner protests that “a 
concept amounts not to a real intuition, but only to the beautiful appearance of an intuition” 
(Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 1: 123-124). 
Nevertheless, Mauthner’s views may be regarded as close to Brentano’s in some respects. 
Both philosophers deny that language refers to external reality. In the Logikkolleg, Brentano 
characterizes language as a “sign of thinking” (Zeichen des Denkens) (EL80, 12.978[9]; see 
Cesalli & Mulligan 2017: 257). This characterization should be taken in a radical sense. In his 
monography on Brentano posthumously published by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, Alfred 
Kastil paraphrases Brentano’s claim as follows: For Brentano, “language is not a direct sign 
for things existing outside the speaker, but a sign for what goes on in her, in her soul”  (Kastil 
1951: 100). 
Both Brentano and Mauthner deny that our language denotes external reality; both claim that 
language ultimately has to do with inner life, namely moods or present mental acts. The 
difference is that, for Brentano, language in some cases really denote internal things, while for 
Mauthner language never denotes anything. 
I’d like now to review three kinds of entities that both Brentano and Mauthner reject as 
linguistic fictions, namely intentional objects, the ego, and general objects. 
3. Three kinds of “word fetishes” 
Some commentators view (rightly in my opinion) Brentano’s rejection of entia rationis as a 
consequence of his theory of intentionality (Huemer 2018). What is more, it is plausible to say 
that the approach just outlined is already at the basis of Brentano’s theory of intentionality in 
the Psychology of 1874. The basic tenet of the theory of intentionality is that present mental 
phenomena really exist and that they necessarily contain in them non-existent phenomena, 
namely physical or mental phenomena that are not presently experienced by the subject. 
Brentano’s theory of intentionality stems from his rejection of the view that all phenomena 
are objects of perception, that is, given as really existent in the present. What Brentano 
advocates instead is his theory of intentionality, namely this view: not all phenomena are 
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perceived; most of them — all physical and non-present mental phenomena — are rather 
imagined, remembered, conceptually thought, and the like. Those phenomena which are not 
perceived do not really exist in the present, although they do presently appear within mental 
acts insofar as they are presently imagined, remembered, etc. 
Thus, Brentano’s purpose in his theory of intentionality is to acknowledge and explain the fact 
that most phenomena are objects although they do not really exist. In other words: most of the 
objects that we represent and designate by nouns are inexistent objects. The use of a noun 
creates in us the illusion that a represented object exists outside of us. In the 1874 Psychology, 
Brentano claims that the existence of the external world is no more than “a fiction to which no 
reality of any sort corresponds” (eine Fiktion, der keinerlei Wirklichkeit entspricht) (Brentano 
1973: 15-16; Engl. transl.: 10-11). And most importantly, Brentano, like Mauthner, holds that 
this fiction is of a linguistic nature. In a famous letter dated March 1905, he declares that the 
intentional object of a representation is not an existing object to which the representation 
corresponds, but merely the “linguistic correlate” of an intentional verb (Brentano 1977: 120). 
The fact that a mental act can have an inexistent object is usually called “representational 
opacity” and considered to be a constitutive property of intentionality. This property can be 
characterized as follows: It is possible that there exists a representation or intentional act x 
such that x represents an object α and α does not exist. The idea is that the verbs expressing 
intentional acts grammatically require a correlate — an α — and that this grammatical 
requirement sometimes misleads us into postulating an existing entity that is denoted by the 
name “α”. 
We could express the same idea by saying that Brentano here seeks to show that the rule in 
virtue of which one infers from “x represents α” to “α exists” is not valid. In other words: The 
rule of existential generalization is not valid for intentional sentences. It is not true that, from 
the existence of an act that has α as its object, one can safely infer that α exists. It is for this 
reason that it makes sense to regard Brentano’s rejection of entia rationis as a consequence of 
his theory of intentionality. A “fiction”, in Brentano’s sense of the word, is precisely 
something whose existence is erroneously inferred from the fact that it is presented and 
linguistically expressed by a name. Therefore, in a way at least, it makes sense to view 
Brentano’s theory of intentionality as part of a more general project in the vein of Mauthner’s 
critique of language. 
The illusion Brentano seeks to dispel through his theory of intentionality is very similar to 
what Mauthner calls “word fetishism”. In his Beiträge (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 1: 160 ff.), 
Mauthner says that the main task of the Sprachkritik is to warn us against “word fetishism”, 
and defines “word fetishism” as the error consisting in inferring from the existence of a name 
to the existence of a named object: “Without a critique of language it will always remain 
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possible to infer from the existence of a name to that of the named object, for example from 
the word deus to the existence of God” (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 1: 173). 
Most interestingly, the same applies in the case of intentional objects. In his small essay on 
language published in 1906 in Martin Buber’s series “Die Gesellschaft”, Mauthner outlines an 
adverbial approach to intentionality. His idea is that the subject-object distinction is purely 
linguistic: it is no more than an illusion created by the grammar of the intentional idiom. 
Actually, sentences of the form “x represents α” never involve any real duality and should be 
construed in the same way as “x builds a building” or “x plays a game”.2 
To illustrate his point, Mauthner tells a funny story from Voltaire’s Zadig (Mauthner 1901-2, 
Vol. 1: 174). Zoroaster has forbidden anyone to eat griffins. His disciples, who all know that 
griffins don’t exist, wonder how their master can have given them such a preposterous 
commandment. Some argue that the commandment is absurd, while others say: “Griffins must 
exist, since Zoroaster wants us not to eat them”. Zadig says this: “If there are any griffins, 
then let’s not eat them. If there aren’t any, then we will eat even less of them. That way we 
shall all be obeying Zoroaster” (Voltaire 1879: 40, transl. Pearson). What interests us here is 
the fetishist inference from the intentional sentence “Zoroaster wants us not to eat griffins” to 
the sentence “griffins exist”. 
Once again, there remains a great difference between Brentano and Mauthner. The former’s 
claim is not that names never refer to real things. In sharp opposition to Mauthner, he 
maintains that there are names that really refer to existent objects. As I said, the late Brentano 
makes a distinction between autosemantic expressions or real names (wahre, eigentliche 
Namen) and synsemantic expressions. The second category includes many expressions which 
are grammatically indistinguishable from real names. 
Leaving intentionality, I now pass to the two remaining kinds of fictions, namely the ego and 
concepts. 
At first sight, the gulf between the two authors’ views about the ego seems unbridgeable. 
Mauthner was an avowed pupil of Ernst Mach, who undoubtedly had a deep influence on his 
thought (Berlage 1994). In particular, Mauthner takes up Mach’s idea that psychophysical 
dualism is a discursive construct with no experiential basis for it. By contrast, Brentano 
                                                 
2 See (Mauthner 1906: 72-3; Mauthner 1910: 370), where Mauthner refers to the medieval-scholastic notion of 
intentional object. Brentano would reject such a formulation due to his commitment to some form of empirical 
dualism. I will discuss this point later on. 
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strongly criticizes Mach’s psychophysical monism, and his theory of intentionality as a whole 
can even be viewed as an attempt to rescue dualism from its empiricist critics (Seron 2019).3 
In spite of this, Mauthner and Brentano defended quite similar views on mental entities. First, 
both follow up Friedrich-Albert Lange’s appeal to a “psychology without soul” (Brentano 
1973: 16, Engl. transl.: 11; Mauthner 1922: 136; Mauthner 1906: 7 ff.; Le Rider 2012: 212). 
Mauthner, like Nietzsche and Mach with his thesis of the “unsalvageable ego”, holds that the 
ego is no more than a grammatical illusion or “fetish word” (Mauthner 1922: 136). Secondly, 
it seems that Mauthner and Brentano agreed to some extent that mental entities were fictions. 
In his Vienna lectures on practical philosophy, Brentano claims that not only the ego, but also 
the entities denoted by psychological categories such as “passion” or “pleasure” are just 
abstracta or fictions and should be rephrased in mereological terms: 
 
We say, “I have overcome my passion (or my pain)”, but we would 
be more precise if we were to say “My inclination to do my duty 
overcame my leanings towards pleasure (or my self-pity)” and still 
more precise — for abstractions are fictions — if we were to say, 
“One part of myself gained a victory over another part of myself”. 
(Brentano 1952: 251, Engl. transl. 156) 
 
This is not very different from Mauthner’s claim that “it is mythology to postulate abstracta 
(sensation, will) as causes of our mental states” (Mauthner 1922: 136). 
The third and last kind of grammatical fictions to be considered are concepts. One of the most 
salient features of Mauthner’s critique of language is his vehement admonition against 
reifying universals — against what he calls “word realism” (Wortrealismus).4 Similarly, 
Brentano’s late reism holds that only individuals can really exist, while universals — “Plato’s 
Idea of an animal, William of Champeaux’s general animal, ‘the animal’ of Husserl” — are 
but fictions (Brentano 1977: 120, 178; Albertazzi 1990: 223). As said earlier, a fiction or ens 
rationis in Brentano’s sense is basically an ens linguae that is illusorily regarded as a real 
thing. A fiction can appear wherever a name does not express a concept psychologically 
                                                 
3 For Mauthner’s Mach-inspired monism, see, for example, (Mauthner 1910: 370-371). On this difference 
between Brentano and Mauthner, see (Albertazzi 1986: 43-44; Bredeck 1992: 106 ff.; Le Rider 2012: 242). 
4 “The medieval-scholastic realism — which I always call ‘word realism’ for the sake of distinction — teaches 
that universals or concepts are something real, that, for example, to the (…) concepts of stallion, horse, 
quadruped, animal, organism, thing, etc., corresponds in the real world something that is not an individual and 
yet is really a stallion, a horse, etc.” (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 3: 616-7). See the related notion of  “concept 
realism” (Begriffsrealismus) in (Vaihinger 1922: 403 ff.). 
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analyzable into intuitive elements, that is, into individual data. Such names, Brentano argues, 
create the “illusion” (Täuschung) that “one has concepts whereas actually there are just 
words” (Brentano 1977: 254). For this reason, psychological analysis centrally serves to 
demarcate fictions from real things. 
4. Some differences 
Let us now pinpoint some substantive differences between Brentano and Mauthner. As 
Gershon Weiler has brilliantly showed in his monography on Mauthner, the most central point 
of difference between the two authors is that Brentano calls for a reformation of language, 
whereas Mauthner views any such reformation as doomed to fail (Weiler 1970: 296 ff.). 
Brentano thinks that ordinary language is misleading and should be amended; Mauthner 
claims that every language whatsoever must be misleading because it is in the nature of 
language to be misleading. For Brentano grammatical illusions are, so to speak, local 
illusions, while Mauthner rejects language in general as globally illusory. 
At least in his latest works, Brentano’s overall project is very similar to the project underlying 
Russell’s theory of descriptions (Weiler 1970: 297). Brentano’s view is that ordinary language 
is deceiving and should be replaced by a philosophical language which is not deceiving, 
namely a language grounded in psychological analysis. Ordinary language is deceiving 
because it uses expressions that are not referential as if they were referential. For example, 
Pegasus is the subject of the proposition “Pegasus is a poetical fiction”. Since the noun 
“Pegasus” is the subject of a proposition, it seems that it must denote something that 
somehow exists. And of course this holds for the proposition “Pegasus doesn’t exist” as well. 
Ordinary language misleads us into believing that even the objects that are correctly said not 
to exist must somehow exist. Thus, the philosopher’s task is to rephrase ordinary language in 
such a way that every subject of a proposition denotes something that really exists. For 
example, “Pegasus is a poetical fiction” should be rephrased as “some representations that are 
experienced by poets and have Pegasus as their content exist”. The subject of the proposition 
— “some representations that…” — here denotes something that really exists. 
This task of reformulating ordinary language involves at least two distinct things. First, as 
Weiler (1970: 297) emphasizes, it involves “sorting out the referring expressions (those which 
are names of things) from those which are not”, that is, among other things, sorting out real 
from fake names. Secondly, the philosopher rephrases. Brentano here uses the word 
“translation” (Übersetzung). In a 1907 dictation entitled “Vom Denken und vom ens rationis”, 
he says the task is to “translate in a speech form with real names” (Übersetzung in eine 
Sprechweise mit eigentlichen Namen) (Brentano 1977: 374). In a letter of 1906, he agrees 
with Marty that the assertions that accept entia rationis should be rephrased in equivalent 
assertions that have realia as their objects (Alle Behauptungen, welche Ihre entia rationis 
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anerkennen würden, würden in Behauptungen, welche Realia zu Objekten haben, ihr 
Äquivalent haben) (Brentano 1977: 173). 
Mauthner is in total disagreement with such views. His rejection of them rests upon four 
theses which are extensively discussed in his works: 
(1) The first thesis is that the illusions of language are indestructible because they are 
motivated by practical interests and that these practical interests themselves cannot be 
eliminated (Mauthner 1906: 81-82). 
(2) The second thesis is that the notion of an ideal language is self-contradictory. Mauthner 
delivered a scathing critique of artificial languages like Esperanto, Volapük, and Leibniz’s 
lingua characteristica, arguing, among other things, that such languages are not different in 
character from natural languages (Mauthner 1906: 31 ff.). 
(3) The third thesis is that there is no universal or “philosophical” grammar.5 Additionally, 
Mauthner considers all grammar intrinsically irrational and for this reason rejects the idea of a 
rational grammar as absurd (Mauthner 1906: 35-36). 
(4) Mauthner’s fourth and final thesis is that thought is reducible to language. As a nominalist, 
he claims that there are no such things as concepts or thoughts, and that what many call 
“thought” is actually but ordinary language (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 1: 112, 176). Thus, there 
is no logic beside and beyond the grammar of ordinary language. The idea of a logical 
language that expresses thought more clearly and univocally than ordinary language is an 
illusion. 
Obviously, Brentano rejects all these theses. Brentano is not a nominalist (Brentano 1977: 
177-8). He believes that conceptual thought is different from language, that the latter can 
express the former more or less adequately, and therefore that logic — that discipline which 
prescribes how to express our thoughts adequately — is distinct from the grammar of ordinary 
language (Albertazzi 1990: 229). In his correspondence with Marty, Brentano holds that 
grammar (i.e., the grammar of ordinary language) is opposed to logic just as illusion is 
                                                 
5 “The human language in itself is an abstractum, an intangible shadow just like the old mental faculties; the 
human language in itself has absolutely no grammar, and hence no philosophical grammar” (Mauthner 1901-2, 
Vol. 1: 193). “It would be timely to cease to dream of a philosophical grammar. There is no general grammar, let 
alone a philosophical one” (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 3: 261, transl. by Weiler 1970: 146). Max Scheler was 
entirely right in his 1914 review of the third volume of Mauthner’s Beiträge (second edition), when he opposed 
to Mauthner Husserl’s project of a “pure grammar” (Scheler 1914: 119). Mauthner criticizes Husserl’s idea of an 
“objective-ideal meaning” in (Mauthner 1910: 90). It is also worth noticing that herein lies a major difference 
between Mauthner’s and the Tractarian Wittgenstein’s critiques of language (Nájera 2007: 161; Gakis 2012: 89). 
The question is whether the illusions of ordinary language are constitutive of language in general, or whether a 
language grounded in logical or psychological analysis can liberate us from them. Also see below on Brentano’s 
distinction between logic and ordinary language grammar. 
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opposed to reality. A fiction corresponds to a fake name, namely to an expression which is 
used grammatically as a substantive while this is not its logical function: “The subject 
function is <here> merely grammatical, not logical” (Brentano 1977: 373-4). Finally, 
Brentano believes that linguistic expressions have a logical or deep grammar function which 
is grounded in natural classifications revealed by psychological analysis. Mauthner, like 
Vaihinger later, rejects the idea of a natural classification as a myth. All our categories of 
thought come from ordinary language and are purely contingent (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 1: 76 




Brentano and Mauthner agree that ordinary language is deceptive insofar as it appears to refer 
to objects it actually does not refer to. They differ in the conclusions they draw from this fact. 
Mauthner concludes that language in general never refers to any object whatsoever. Linguistic 
reference itself is a deceiving appearance: the actual function of language in general is 
expressive rather than referential. As Le Rider emphasizes, “it is not such-and-such usage of 
language that Mauthner criticizes, but human language in general. In his view, it is not 
possible to rectify or amend language so as to make it usable as an instrument for knowledge” 
(Le Rider 2012: 221-2). By contrast, Brentano, like Russell and others, claims that ordinary 
language actually refers to other objects than those it appears to refer to. Thus, it must be 
possible to elaborate a philosophical language that appears to denote what it really denotes — 
a language that explicitly refers to present mental life by univocally articulating concepts 
directly abstracted from inner perception. 
At a more general level, Mauthner’s and Brentano’s accounts of grammatical illusions may as 
well be viewed as different ways of dealing with one and the same paradox generated by the 
radical form of empiricism — something in the vein of Mach’s monism of sensation — they 
both largely adhere to. This paradox may be explained as follows: (1) Knowledge needs to 
somehow relate to objects that really exist. (2) All that can be said to really exist are the 
individual data of present perception. (3) As a matter of fact, knowledge (in the normal sense 
of scientific knowledge) is about objects that are not presently perceived and thus cannot be 
                                                 
6 Albertazzi very rightly opposes Mauthner’s “substantial conventionalism” to Brentano’s project of a “reform of 
language” that “in no way reduces the possibility of an ontology, albeit strongly reist, guaranteed in the last 
analysis by the fact of inner perception relative to the representation of things, and guarantor in its turn of the 
symbolic translation performed by the common innere Sprachform” (Albertazzi 1989: 149, 154; see also 
Albertazzi 1996: 103). 
12 
said to really exist. In Brentano’s view, the physical phenomena studied in the natural 
sciences do not exist in any sense. Likewise, psychological knowledge deals with either the 
psychologist’s own mental phenomena she remembers or mental phenomena she attributes to 
others. In either cases the psychologist pretends to “know” objects that she does not presently 
perceive and thus cannot truly recognize as really existing (Seron 2017a; Seron 2017b).  
Such considerations — including the view that “all our representations, sensorially produced, 
can only relate to the past” (Mauthner 1922: 137) — lead Mauthner to the skeptical 
conclusion that the concept of knowledge is self-contradictory. Indeed, knowledge 
conceptually involves both language and referring to reality.7 But language is essentially 
fictitious and thus “impotent as an instrument for knowledge” (Mauthner 1901-2, Vol. 1: 94). 
Since the objects of knowledge cannot be both real things (1) and fictions (3), knowledge is 
therefore impossible. 
By contrast, Brentano’s theory of intentionality may be seen as an attempt to block the 
skeptical implications of the above paradox. His solution is to distinguish the object of 
knowledge from its experiential source: knowledge relates to really existing objects that are 
numerically distinct from the objects it is about. For example, psychological knowledge is 
rooted in perceptual experience not in the sense that it is about mental phenomena that are 
presently perceived (which is obviously not the case), but in the sense that the psychologist 
presently perceives her act of remembering the phenomenon her knowledge is about, that is, 
an act in which the object of psychological knowledge appears in another mode than 
perception. Brentano’s theory of intentionality seeks to clarify how some objects — as 
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